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I Would, but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit Nor
Voice Substantially Limits Big City Corruption
David Schleicher*

I. INTRODUCTION

When I told the Dean at my law school, the estimable Dan Polsby,
that I was going to Chicago to deliver a lecture on political corruption,
he said, "I lived there a long time, and, as the saying goes, that sounds
like bringing coals to Newcastle."' This is certainly a common belief.
The term "Chicago politician" has become national shorthand for a
corrupt public official. 2 New York, where I grew up, also figures in
stories of political corruption in America, with Thomas Nast's cartoons
of the Tammany Tiger and Boss Tweed (and, much later, Martin
Scorcese's version of him in the movie Gangs of New York3 ) serving as
warnings to all Americans about the sordidness of big city government.4
Some of this is hype. After all, there is corruption to be found in
every area of the country and at all levels of government. And
* Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. This paper was presented as
a speech at the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal's wonderful conference, "The Scandal of
Political Corruption and The Law's Response." I would like to thank the participants in the
conference for their comments.
1. The first known use (at least as far as I can find) of this term comes from THOMAS FULLER,
ANGLORUM SPECULUM, OR THE WORTHIES OF ENGLAND, IN CHURCH AND STATE 552 (1684)

("To carry Coals to Newcastle. That is ... to busy one's self in a needless imployment.").
2. For instance, in the 2008 Presidential campaign, Senator John McCain used the term
repeatedly as a criticism of then-Senator Barack Obama. Chicagoans seem to revel in similar
beliefs about their local officials. As Dick Gregory noted, "In most places in the country, voting
is looked upon as a right and a duty, but in Chicago it's a sport. In Chicago not only your vote
counts, but all kinds of other votes-kids, dead folks, and so on." DICK GREGORY, DICK
GREGORY'S POLITICAL PRIMER 69 (1972).
3.

GANGS OF NEW YORK (Miramax Films 2002).

4.

See KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, BOSS TWEED: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CORRUPT POL

WHO CONCEIVED THE SOUL OF MODERN NEW YORK 6-8, 134-39, 252-54 (2005) (discussing
Nast's cartoons); GANGS OF NEW YORK (Miramax Films 2002). The best movie about big city

political corruption is surely Preston Sturgis's The Great McGinty (Paramount Pictures 1940).
The movie's famous quote-memorable to students of urban politics-was said by Daniel "Dan"
McGinty to a party boss about getting paid for voting: "Never mind the applesauce! How do I get
the bucks?"
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determining the relative susceptibility to corruption of levels of
government is an impossible empirical question, as it requires some
baseline understanding of what the expected rate of corruption at each
level ought to be.
Still, it is hard to shake the popular belief that there is something
about big city government that makes corruption particularly likely.
This article intends to lay out, from the perspective of economic and
political theory, why it might be the case that big city governments
suffer more from corruption than other types of governments. It will
also discuss the traditional responses to the problem of big city political
corruption, the costs of those responses, and what might be done to help
cure the problem of corruption in big cities without imposing these
costs.
This will require a bit of wind-up, but I will tell you where I am
going.
First, successful big cities are more likely than suburbs or small
towns to have corruption problems not merely because of the size of
their governments but because of exactly what makes them successfulwhat economists call agglomeration economies. 5 Big cities draw
residents and businesses because they provide people with a number of
attractions-things like deep labor and consumption markets, and
information spillovers-and drive them away because of congestion, or
the high cost of urban land. Government policies play a role in
determining whether individuals stay in or leave a big city, but only a
secondary one; the choice is largely driven by whether the benefits and
costs of city living are worth it. In contrast, when someone is deciding
which small town or suburb to live in, government policies like the
quality of schools or property tax rates play a crucial and often decisive
role. As a result, big city residents are less likely to punish bad
governmental policies by exiting the jurisdiction, and this makes
corruption more likely. Further, the more successful big cities are as
economic centers, the less likely its residents will be responsive to
governmental corruption. It is like the joke from Annie Hall about a
man who tells his doctor that his brother is crazy and thinks he is a
chicken. When the doctor asks the man why he does not turn his
brother in, the man responds, "I would, but I need the eggs." 6 Cities
may be crazy and corrupt, but their residents need the eggs.
5. See infra Part II (describing why exit only imposes a weak constraint on big city political
corruption).
6. See ANNIE HALL (Rollins-Joffe Productions 1977) ("After that it got pretty late, and we
both had to go, but it was great seeing Annie again. I . . . I realized what a terrific person she was,
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Second, the fact that national political parties contest local elections,
but do so without rebranding themselves at the local level on local
issues, has left cities without regular political party competition, the
traditional tonic for political corruption.7 The lack of local partisan
competition is caused by the interaction between election laws unsuited
to the problems of local elections and predictable aspects of voter
behavior.
Third, responses to the problem of urban political corruption have
been partially successful, but not without substantial costs.8 These costs
include imposing severe limits on the ability of locals to determine local
policy and extensive inter-local governmental externalities.
Finally, the problems of urban corruption are best addressed by
increasing, rather than decreasing, local democracy, particularly by
encouraging local partisan competition. This article will conclude by
suggesting a few ideas about how to achieve this goal. 9
II. "I DON'T WANT TO MOVE TO A CITY WHERE THE ONLY CULTURAL
10
ADVANTAGE IS BEING ABLE TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN ON A RED LIGHT"
WHY EXIT IMPOSES ONLY A WEAK CONSTRAINT ON BIG CITY POLITICAL
CORRUPTION

Albert Hirschman famously divided the ways citizens can influence
politics into two categories: exit and voice." Citizens can influence a
government by either leaving or entering a jurisdiction (or threatening
to leave or enter) or can attempt to influence its decisions directly
through voting or other methods of popular participation. Hirschman
suggested there were trade-offs between these options: where exit is less
available, citizens will try harder to use voice to influence government
decisions, and where popular participation is difficult, exit becomes
more likely. 12
and ... and how much fun it was just knowing her; and I.. . I, I thought of that old joke, y'know,
the, this . . .this guy goes to a psychiatrist and says, 'Doc, uh, my brother's crazy; he thinks he's a
chicken.' And, uh, the doctor says, 'Well, why don't you turn him in?' The guy says, 'I would,
but I need the eggs.' Well, I guess that's pretty much now how I feel about relationships; y'know,
they're totally irrational, and crazy, and absurd, and . . . but, uh, I guess we keep goin' through it
because, uh, most of us ... need the eggs.").
7. See infra Part m (explaining why party competition is an inefficient constraint on
corruption in big cities).
8. See infra Part IV (describing various attempts at political reform).
9. See infra Part V (proposing new methods for reigning in political corruption in big cities).
10. This, again, is from ANNIE HALL, supra note 6.
11. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExrT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 37 (1970) (explaining that voice

can function as an alternative or a complement to exit).
12. Id. at 34.
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Both exit (and the threat thereof) and voice give citizens tools to
influence government. Similarly, both exit and voice should serve to
The term "corruption" is
constrain governmental corruption.
notoriously difficult to define. But whatever the definition, we can say
that corrupt acts are not for the general good and are not preferred by
the majority of the citizenry. 13 Although there is disagreement about
most policies, we can be relatively certain city residents do not like
governmental officials enriching themselves at the public trough.
Corruption is, for my purposes here, just a special case of an ordinary
problem where government actions and popular preferences diverge.
As both exit and voice serve to give local residents influence over local
governments, they both should constrain bad behavior by local
politicians.
There is a long literature on why local governments are generally
good at matching preferences to policies. The explanation lies with exit
and the threat of exit by residents. Charles Tiebout developed the most
well-known economic model of local government, and he argued that, if
residents are perfectly mobile, employment does not depend on housing
location, and if there are many local governments providing exclusively
local public services, local public services will be provided at the most
efficient level. 14 Individuals in Tiebout's model "sort" to their preferred
package of taxes and services by moving between local governments,
and everyone gets what they want. There is no need for voice-exit
does all the work. The same forces that make policy responsive to voter
preferences serve as a check on local corruption. If local politicians are
corrupt, mobile residents will leave (and others will not want to come),
driving down property prices and depriving the city of residents and tax
revenue. 15
Tiebout's model has been criticized for utilizing unrealistic
assumptions and for promoting a privatized notion of local government,
but there is substantial evidence that sorting does occur. 16
13. One notable problem for people studying corruption is that it is difficult to distinguish
between governmental policy-making that is venal and policy-making that is just bad or dumb.
For my purposes, no distinction needs to be drawn: corruption is simply a special category of
policies that is likely to be disfavored by residents.
14. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416, 419-24

(1956). "The dominant law and economics model of local government, based on the work of
Charles M. Tiebout, assumes that decentralization of power to local governments promotes the
efficient delivery of public goods and services." Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal
Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REv. 503, 503 (2002).

15. Willie Sutton once noted that he robbed banks because that was where the money is. A
city without many resources is not a particularly attractive target for corrupt politicians.
16. See, e.g., GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
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Capitalization, or the degree to which the quality of public policies are
captured in housing prices, is a real empirical phenomenon-people pay
more to live in local governments with good schools and low taxes. 17
Other scholars, particularly William Fischel, have added voice to the
Tiebout model by explaining why small city voters are likely to demand
good behavior. Exiting a jurisdiction is costly, and by controlling
policy, homeowners can reduce the variation in the value of their
house-most people's most important asset. 18 In small towns, local
policies are highly responsive to "homevoters" seeking to protect the
value of their investment, and the quality of those policies is reflected in
housing prices.
However, capitalization works less well in big cities, and the reason
lies in each of us big city residents. 19 When we make arguments for and
against living in a big city, we necessarily include many factors
unrelated to the quality of government services. Economists studying
why cities develop have come up with three central types of what they
call "agglomeration economies," or reasons people locate near one
another. 20
WALLS 167-73 (1999) (criticizing Tiebout's vision of local government); Sheryll B. Cashin,

Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:Addressing the Barriersto New
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1991-2015 (2000) (commenting on Tiebout's prediction that
citizens would migrate to certain areas of a metropolis based on their desired blend of taxes and
services); Richard C. Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1824, 1834 (2003)
(explaining that the ability to pay for public services largely affects how they are distributed); cf
Richard Briffault, Our Localism, PartII: Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346,
399-419, 426 (1990) (praising Tiebout for providing a more accurate picture of local
governmental power than other scholars, but claiming the model does not properly address the
problem and ubiquity of externalities created by local policies).
17. See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT
FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 25-27 (William A.
Fischel ed., 2006) (summarizing research on capitalization); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of
Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax
Capitalizationand the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 968 (1969) (same).
18. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES 8 (2001)
[hereinafter FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS] (developing a Tiebout consistent theory of local
voting); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments,
12 URB. STUD. 205, 211 (1975).
19. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL L. REV. 2, 32
(forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Schleicher, The City], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1471555 (suggesting that individual sorting for policies among local
governments "reduces agglomerative efficiency").
20. The literature on the topic is extensive. For summaries, see MAHISA FUJITA, PAUL
KRUGMAN & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-6 (1999); EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND
SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 1-12 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.
139, 139-50 (1998) [hereinafter Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?]; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David
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The first is reducing transport costs for goods-factories and their
suppliers often locate near one another in order to reduce shipping
costs. 21 This was once the dominant explanation for city development,
but as domestic shipping costs have fallen, it has become less important.
The second is market size. Both individuals and firms like locating
in places with deep labor markets. Employees in deep labor markets
can specialize and hence become more productive, face reduced search
costs, and have insurance against firm-specific risk (that is, they know
they will likely be able to get a new job without moving if their
employers go belly up). 2 2 Similarly, many residents like living in
places with large and diverse consumption and entertainment markets
for the same reasons-specialization, reduction in search costs, and
insurance that you will find what you are looking for when you go
there. 23 For instance, people like being able to choose between the
dozens of blues clubs on Beale Street in Memphis or one of the
thousands of diamond dealers on 47th Street in Manhattan. 24 Big city
market size even affects the quality of dating. Single people like living
in cities because their deep pools of other single people reduce search
costs (i.e., there are crowded bars full of other single people), provide
opportunities for specialization, and provide insurance against "firm"
specific risk, like a break-up. 25

Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban

Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262-63 (2010); Schleicher, The City, supra note 19, at
11-29; Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic
Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 311, 318-19 (2010).
21. This can explain why Chicago developed. It was the center of the rail transportation
network necessary to get the products of farms from the Midwest. Once that occurred, it made
sense for final goods manufacturers to locate near the rail hub, and then for other factories to
locate near the final goods factories. See Edward L. Glaeser & Janet Kohlhase, Cities, Regions
and the Decline of Transport Costs, 83(1) REGIONAL SCI. 197, 198-99 (2004) (explaining that

Chicago was built as a transport hub enabling the movement of lumber, wheat, and cattle to the
east coast and to Europe); Edward L. Glaeser & Ciacomo A.M. Ponzetto, Did the Death of
Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?, NBER Working Paper No. 13710 (Dec. 2007)

("[Wlhen firms and people are located near each other in cities and in industrial clusters, they
benefit in various ways."). However, other explanations are needed for why Chicago has
prospered in a post-industrial age.
22. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 20, at 146 (noting that large labor markets
provide insurance to workers whose jobs may disappear due to industry-specific shocks).
23. See Schleicher, The City, supra note 19, at 17 (discussing how urban consumption markets
feature a wider range of products that make it more likely that a consumer will find a particular
good, which thus drives people to shop and live in cities).
24.

Id.

25. Id. at 20.
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The final category of agglomeration gains is knowledge spillovers. 26
Firms and individuals learn from one another if they are close together.
Software firms do not set up shop in Silicon Valley for the low rents or
the vibrant social scene; they do it for the intellectual ferment. 27 This is
reflected in wage growth, which is higher in cities than it is in rural
areas. Employers pay for productivity, and urban workers learn from
others at higher rates, causing their wages to rise. 28
On the other side of the equation is the problem of congestion, or
high rents. If you look for a downtown apartment, it is going to be
much more expensive per square foot than a house in the suburbs.
Residents make a decision balancing the agglomeration benefits of
living downtown against the costs of real estate and the other assorted
hassles of city living. Robert Lucas summed this up when he said,
"What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for,
if not for being near other people." 29
Some agglomeration economies are regional. For instance, virtually
everyone in a region gets the benefits of depth in most labor markets
because people can live in one place and commute to another. But
others are highly local. 30 You do not go to lunch with, and hence get
knowledge spillovers from, someone who lives 100 miles away. You
cannot have a choice of dozens of neighborhood bars and walk home if
you do not live near them. And it is really hard to date someone who
lives on the other side of a metropolitan area.
These localized agglomeration economies make individual location
decisions sticky. They are not, however, transaction costs. Individuals
stay in cities because they like the people there, and do so despite the
fact that those other people might have very different preferences for
local policy. 3 1 Exit is thus limited as a way to constrain government

26. Alfred Marshall, the leading macroeconomist of the turn of the last century and the first
major theorist of agglomeration economics, described the effect of industrial concentration on
information: "[Tihe mysteries of the trade become no mystery but are, as it were, in the air ..... "
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcONOMICS 271 (8th ed. 1940).

27. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 20, at 148 (explaining that learning occurs
through interaction between specialists in a particular industry).
28. Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Mar6, Cities and Skills, 19(2) J. LAB. ECON. 316, 316-19
(2001). There is roughly a 33% urban wage premium. Id.
29. Robert Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3,

39 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
30. See Schleicher, The City, supra note 19, at 37-38 (explaining that the spreading caused by
extensive zoning has a negative effect on agglomerative efficiency because as people spread out,
the degree to which they are a part of the same labor, consumption, and social markets decreases).
31.

Id. at 37-42.
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policy because people do not want to abandon their favored set of
neighbors.
Both the benefits of agglomeration and the costs of its flip sidecongestion and high rents-are felt most heavily in big cities.32 When
you decide to live in Chicago rather than some suburb, you are doing it
because you like the amenities of living downtown and because you are
willing to pay the increased cost per square foot in order to get them. A
single person who likes the ability to go out to Chicago bars every night
is not going to want to move to Arlington Heights merely because she
cannot stand Mayor Daley.
Now, this should not be overstated. City residents do frequently
leave cities because they do not like city services, be it schools,
policing, or something else. But city residents are less sensitive to
government policies than someone choosing between two suburbs,
where tax rates, land use regulation, and school quality are likely to be
the determinative factors. The result is that exit and entrance-the ways
in which current and future residents affect policies by deciding where
to live-is less of a constraint on big city policymaking than it is on
suburban policymaking.
This has effects on what types of policies are chosen. It also affects
how much agglomeration there is; sorting reduces the efficiency of
agglomeration, as I have argued elsewhere. 33 For our purposes here,
however, it provides an explanation for why big cities may be less
resistant to corruption than suburbs. Corrupt suburban governments
will be punished by a strong fall in property values and tax revenue
because people leave (and do not come back to) governments that
squander public money. People in Chicago hear about political
corruption and just go to their favorite hot dog place (of which they
have many, many choices) and write it off as another cost of living in a
big city.
III. "YOU'RE LIKE NEW YORK, JEWISH, LEFT-WING, LIBERAL,
INTELLECTUAL, CENTRAL PARK WEST, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, THE
SOCIALIST SUMMER CAMPS AND THE, THE FATHER WITH THE BEN SHAHN
DRAWINGS" 34 : THE FAILURE OF BIG CITY PARTY COMPETITION
If exit does not constrain big city political corruption as much as it
does in the suburbs, what about voice? Why does political competition

32. Id.

33. Id. at 43-48.
34. You are catching on to the theme. ANNIE HALL, supra note 6.
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not cause corrupt politicians to lose power and reward squeaky-clean
reformers?
In small towns, there is evidence that voters are relatively well
informed and police local government actions. 35 They do so because of
the possibility of influence and the effect on their biggest investment,
their home. However, big cities do not work this way; voters are as
distant from the government of the City of Chicago or the City of New
York as they are from state and national governments. 36 In larger
governments we generally rely on party competition to constrain
corruption, but big American cities do not have party competition. 37
Why not? Well, this is a puzzle. Most big cities favor one party in
national elections. 38 Under basic theories of how parties compete, we
might expect this fact not to matter in local elections. The local branch
of the minority party should, following Anthony Downs's famous
Median Voter Theorem model, tack to the middle of the local electorate
on local issues to make local elections competitive. 39 But it does not
happen. This is particularly surprising because there is a lot of evidence
that opinions about national politics-war, income taxes, health care
reform-do not track closely with preferences about local issues (e.g.,
zoning, methods of teaching reading, whether to build sports stadia,
etc.). 40
35. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 18, at 1-10.
36. Fischel argues that cities of over 100,000 do not have the same dynamics as smaller ones,
but the number is merely an approximation (and is probably too high). Id. at 14-16, 89-94.
37. There is a massive literature on political party machines and their utility in acclimating
immigrant groups into a modern economy. See generally DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD
SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 64-68 (1998) (discussing
how urban party machines brokered a deal: business elites gave control over the local
governments to working-class ethnic politicians, and machine politicians promised to leave
business alone). This article will not address this literature except to note that one-party
dominance has lasted long after the machines and their ethnic patronage mills left the political
scene. To the extent that we want to explore lack of competition in modern cities, we need a
generalizable theory.
38.

See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?:

The Role of Election Lw, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 438-39 (2007) [hereinafter Schleicher, City
Council Elections] (noting that most American cities are dominated by one party).
39. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-17 (1957)
(explaining that, in a two-party system, each party would move toward the ideological "middle"
of the electorate to attract the majority of voters).
40. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 38, at 439-45 (arguing that national
policy preferences do not correlate strongly with local policy preferences). In fact, a growing
body of research shows that partisan affiliation tells us almost nothing about local politicians.
Fernando Ferriera and Joseph Gyourko have found that the party of the winning candidate in
close mayoral elections has no effect on the size of local government, the allocation of local
spending, or crime rates. Fernando Ferriera & Joseph Gyourko, Do Political Parties Matter?
Evidence from U.S. Cities, 124 Q. J. ECON. 349, 399 (2009). Elizabeth Gerber and Daniel
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The best explanation (or at least the one I have offered elsewhere)
lies in the interaction between election laws and predictable aspects of
voter behavior. 4 1 In cities with partisan elections, a variety of laws
guarantee that national parties-the Democrat and the Republican-get
on the ballot. Further, election laws and party rules create substantial
costs for individuals who wish to switch parties between elections.
Finally, parties have a constitutional right to use funds raised for one
type of office to conduct campaigns for another.
Election laws guarantee that voters see Democrats and Republicans
on the ballot. This turns out to be crucial if we make a basic assumption
about big city voters-that they do not know much about individual
local candidates. This assumption makes sense. Voters everywhere
have little incentive to become well-informed about politics, and there is
a great deal of empirical evidence that most voters know very little
about most candidates and policy issues at any level of government. 42
Certainly, upon reflection, very few of us know much about the policy
positions of our alderman or city councilman. However, voters do
develop impressions of political parties over time. In political scientist
Morris Fiorina's famous term, voters use whatever impressions they
have about politics to develop "running tallies" of their preferences
about parties. 43 When it comes time to vote, they can use their collected
recollections about parties as a guide. This can work at the national
level. As long as parties are consistent, both internally and over time,
running tallies allow voters to use elections to hold politicians
accountable for their decisions.4 Relevant and useful party labels on
Hopkins found that the mayoral party does affect spending on local police and fire-fighting
departments (Republican and Independent mayors spend more than Democratic mayors) but not
any other public policy variable. Elizabeth Gerber & Daniel Hopkins, When Mayors Matter:
Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy (Sept. 28, 2010) (working paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1475237.
41. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 38, at 449-51 (detailing the set of
election laws and party rules that form the causal mechanisms that permit national parties to
dominate local elections, e.g., a rational and uninformed voter will vote for her preferred national
party).
42. See id. at 457-60 (showing that, absent partisan identification, voters have little useful
policy-based information about candidates); David Schleicher, What if Europe Held an Election
and No One Cared?, 52 HARV. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Schleicher, What if
Europe?], available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1525015.
43.

MORRIS P. RORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 89 (1981).

44. Schleicher, What if Europe?, supra note 42, at 61-67; see also FIORINA, supra note 43, at

65-78, 193-200 (1981) (discussing retrospective voting, voter rationality, and electoral
accountability). This brief article is not the place to rehash the long debate about how good party
heuristics are at making uninformed voters (or voting populations) act as if they were informed.
See Schleicher, What if Europe?, supra, at 61-67 (maintaining that voters use a scorecard to keep
track of a political party's past that serves as a guide for their future votes). However, suffice to
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the ballot are tools for voters; with them, voters can use their vote (at
least to a degree) to comment on the successes and failures of different
public policies.
Voter ignorance of local candidates is more costly, as national party
membership tells us very little about candidates at the local level.
Knowing someone is a Democrat or Republican may tell you a great
deal about her preferences about abortion or health reform but will not
tell you much about her preferences about zoning. However, this does
not make it less likely that voters rely on party labels in local races.
Party labels may tell voters very little about local candidates, but as
voters have little other information, it is better than nothing. So an
individual's preference in national elections is reflected in local voting.
But why does the minority party not respond by taking popular issue
stances on local issues, as we would expect them to in a Downsian
model?45 If the local Republicans (or Democrats) are losing local races,
they could theoretically adopt popular positions about schools or
policing and make races competitive. This does not happen for two
reasons. 46 First, laws require the use of primary elections at the local
level. If preferences on national issues and local issues do not track
each other particularly closely, then members of the minority party will
not be consistent on local issues. Its candidates, chosen in primaries,
will not be consistent across town and across time. This makes it
difficult for local parties to successfully brand themselves on local
issues. Second, the limits on party switching mean that voters (and
more crucially candidates and activists) will not switch parties for the
purpose of local elections and local primaries. This means that the
minority local party will not attract voters who do agree on local issues
and produce consistent candidates. Further, the minority party will not
attract popular potential politicians because these ambitious types will
not be able to climb the ladder and run for other types of office after
they have joined the local minority party. The result is a lack of
competition between the major parties-the party that is popular in
national elections is guaranteed to win local elections-and the

say that voters without useful party heuristics are worse than those armed with them.
45. Downs, supra note 39, at 114-17.
46. See Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 38, at 450-53 (explaining that local
legislative elections are low salience, and it is nearly impossible to convince voters to pay
attention to a purely local party and even more impossible to convince voters to abandon their
pre-set party identification; the only way around these barriers is to compete at both the national
and local level, which is also nearly impossible as national campaigns are extremely competitive
and costly).
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elections end up telling us very little about local preferences of local
issues.
Despite the lack of competition, there is not much entry by local-only
third parties. 47 Local-only third parties face the same hurdles that all
third parties in American politics do-what political scientists call
Duverger's Law, or the desire of voters not to waste their votes (and the
desires of donors and activists to support winners and not also-rans). 48
Further, the limits on party switching doom these local-only parties to
be without candidates, organizers, and a representative primary
electorate. And the constitutionally protected right of major parties to
use their financial and organizational muscle in local elections puts
local-only parties at an even greater disadvantage.
Thus, the lack of competition between parties is caused by a
mismatch between the level of the election and the level of the party
system. But what about primaries? Why are primaries inside the local
majority party not enough to produce locally representative results?
The fundamental flaw of urban elections is that uninformed voters do
not have access to a high-value informational heuristic, the party label,
that allows them to vote based on policy preferences. 49 In general
elections in big cities, party labels are only very weak guides to the
local policy preferences of politicians. But in primaries, voters have no
heuristic whatsoever. There are no party labels on a primary ballotevery candidate runs on his or her own. And as a result, primaries do
not regularly feature ideological competition, and winners are
determined by things like ethnic voting, interest group effort, or
campaign spending. 50
Absent political parties that push one another over time to produce
representative results, political officials have a great deal of slack. This
breeds corruption. Reformers win now and again, when things get
really bad, but absent the ability to organize and access the ballot, they
are doomed to have only a passing influence on politics in a big city.
As George Washington Plunkitt, the bard of New York City's
Democratic Party Tammany Hall Machine once said, "[Reform
committees] were mornin' glories-looked lovely in the morning and
47. Id. at 452. There is only one major local-only third party in the United States, the Charter
Party of Cincinnati. Id.
OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
48. AREND LUPHART, PATTERNS
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 165-70 (1999) (stating that plurality representation
systems tend to marginalize small political parties and encourage two-party systems).
49. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 38, at 460-63. The same thing goes for
non-partisan elections.
50. Id.
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withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on
flourishing forever, like fine old oaks."51
Competition permits voice, and voice checks government corruption.
Given the lack of competition in local elections, we should expect
corruption-political competition, far more than sunlight, is the best
disinfectant. 52 Unlike small cities, where it is easy to monitor local
officials and the threat of exit constrains government choices, big cities
need functioning elections to check corruption. But they do not have
them.
IV. "EVERYTHING OUR PARENTS SAID WAS GOOD ISBAD. SUN, MILK, RED
MEAT . .. COLLEGE" 53: REFORM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

This section will only briefly discuss prior efforts to limit urban
political corruption (one could go on endlessly on the topic, as the
desire to limit corruption has driven much of the development of local
government law in the twentieth century). However, this short section
will suggest one basic theme has run through a huge number of very
different attacks on local corruption: reformers regularly throw the
proverbial baby of local democracy out with the corrupt bathwater of
big city politics.
The problem of big city political corruption has, from time to time,
become a major national political issue, and when it has, a number of
different tools have been used to slay the old political machines (which
largely have gone the way of the dodo bird). These changes have had
some successes in limiting local political corruption-there are not the
old-school political machines and corrupt docks that there used to bebut have come with their own costs.

I will only use a few examples. Financial crises in cities that funded
railroads led to the development of Dillon's Rule, the state court rule
that cities had no powers that were not directly delegated to them by the
state government and that all delegations should be interpreted

51. WILLIAM L. RIORDON, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL: A SERIES OF VERY PLAIN TALKS
ON VERY PRACTICAL POLITICS 30-31 (Bibliolife 2009) (1905). Plunkitt makes clear that the
failure of reformers to form parties that engage in politics is the reason they could not dent
Tammany Hall's power over the long term. "The fact is that a reformer can't last in politics." Id.
at 34.
52. There is an interesting debate about the importance, or usefulness, of transparency in
politics. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885, 942 (2006)
(proposing that a better informed public would result in more accountability on the part of the
government).
53. Once again, ANNIE HALL, supra note 6.

290

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 42

narrowly. 54 Although most big cities are now governed by some
version of "home rule," which gives cities more power to initiate
policies and sometimes provides state constitutional protection against
state legislative incursion on local autonomy, the powers of local
governments are still substantially circumscribed.55 This may limit
corruption, but it also limits local democratic decision making and the
amount of local variation in policies, and hence the fit between
individual preferences and policies.
The Progressive Movement at the turn of the century pushed for a
number of reforms of city governance in response to the political
control exercised by party machines, but this article will only discuss
two: non-partisan elections and special-purpose governments.
Removing all party notations from local ballots did not, as was claimed,
produce politics that were more competitive. Voters are even more
ignorant in non-partisan local elections than they are in partisan ones.
Just as in primaries, voters do not have labels on the ballot that allow
them to determine a candidate's position on the issues. As a result,
turnout falls, and non-policy variables determine who wins elections. 56
Non-partisan elections have generally been successful in removing
party machines in favor of reform alliances but have done so at the cost
of limiting the ability of locals to shape local policy.
Similarly, special-purpose governments have reduced local political
autonomy. Unelected or specially elected bodies provide many local
services. 57 The most well known of these are school boards, but water,
roads, transportation, and many of the other major local services are
provided by these institutions. Whether these organizations provide
better or worse services (or less corruption) is an open question, but, as
elections to them are even less likely to be salient when they occur, they
have the effect of removing political autonomy from locals about local
policies.
Even more centrally, America's most important local government
policies are rules that encourage the creation of many local governments

54. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101-02 (1872);
see RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 314-17

(7th ed. 2009); Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 83, 92-95 (1986) (discussing

how Dillon's Rule, by making cities subservient to the state, limited cities' power to undertake
any activity, not only in the context of selling bonds to help finance railroads, which was a typical
scenario that emerged after the Civil War, but in all activities).
55. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 54, at 331-36.
56. Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 38, at 465-67.
57. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 54, at 13-16.
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in every region. As noted earlier, small governments, unlike big ones,
are usually very democratically responsive, giving residents the
influence by means of both exit and voice. But having lots of small
governments has costs as well. First, it reduces the extent of
agglomeration gain across a region by encouraging sorting to places that
are not necessarily where people would have located absent the
existence of lots of local governments. 58 Second, it increases the
likelihood of externalities between localities, particularly because
contracting between local governmental entities is costly. 59
Finally, cities have an internal system of separated powers. For
example, district attorneys-and often other officials-are elected
separately from mayors and county executives. This may have benefits,
but limiting corruption is not likely one of them. As Richard Pildes and
Daryl Levinson have shown on the national level, separation of powers
is not likely to create checks where one party controls all the different
entities. 60 Local officials usually come from the same party and thus
will have little incentive to check one another. If an official criticizes a
co-partisan, the party becomes less popular, and they both will be
harmed politically. Further, individual politicians rely on support inside
local parties, giving them little incentive to investigate their patrons and
co-partisans. There is simply no reason to believe that local officials in
big city governments are likely to check one another. 61
58. If the governments were small enough, perhaps, there would be no harm to agglomeration
because it would not cause anyone to move from their preferred neighborhood; if each small tract
had its own government, the agglomeration costs of sorts would fall. But this would increase the
harms of externalities and would ensure that local governments were not the optimal size to
provide public goods efficiently. See Schleicher, The City, supra note 19, at 37 n.161 (noting that
zoning will distort housing choices among both non-residents of a jurisdiction, by barring them
from entering, and residents of a jurisdiction, by affecting their housing choices).
59. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains,76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 190,

192-209 (2001) (discussing attractiveness and difficulties with inter-city contracting); Clayton P.
Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J.L. & POL. 365, 367-82 (2005) (same).
60. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separationof Parties,Not Powers, 119 HARV.

L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006) (noting that when the legislative and executive branches are controlled
by a single party, competition may disappear entirely).
61. Rick Hills, in probably the best law review article written about local political corruption,
makes a provocative claim about how we should prosecute bad local political actors. Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve
Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 144 (2005). He claims that

differences in the kind of democracy practiced at the federal and local levels makes it unwise to
apply federal anti-corruption and conflict of interest laws to local actors. Democracy at the
federal level is "bureaucratic populism," or a system in which the people selecting Congress,
because of the high salience of its decisions, are able to monitor it through elections. At the local
level, the model is different; it is according to Hills, "participatory populism," which "mix[es]
professional and lay decision-making" as the "elected legislators are often-indeed, usuallypart-time, under-paid officers with substantial private interests in the community," and where the
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These policies have benefits and costs, and this is not the place to
resolve these debates. Instead, this article will suggest that there are
other ways of dealing with local corruption and the lack of
representativeness in big city local politics.
V. "I HAVE TO GO NOW, DUANE, BECAUSE I, I'M DUE BACK ON THE
PLANET EARTH" 62 : BRINGING ORDINARY POLITICS TO BIG AMERICAN
CITIES

If exit and voice are two ways to check urban political corruption,
which should be encouraged? Encouraging exit, or rather encouraging
it further, is problematic. As it stands, the multitude of local
governments in most metropolitan areas already encourages exit.
Although this promotes gains from Tiebout sorting, it also reduces the
efficiency of urban agglomeration. 63 Systems with many small local
governments encourage people to move away from their ideal location
in a metropolitan area to receive their preferred package of
governmental policies, and this reduces regional economic efficiency.
Further, if there are any fixed costs in providing public services (and
there surely are), reducing the size of local government by too much
will increase the average costs of providing public services.
However, the pathways of political competition could be improved.
Instead of mandating non-partisan elections, which makes the lack of
competition worse, states could pass laws that would either enable local
branches of national parties to better differentiate themselves from their
national parents or encourage the development of purely local parties.
The most attractive ideas are those that encourage rebranding at the
local level. A city could, as Chris Elmendorf and I have recommended,
give high profile mayoral candidates the ability to endorse other local
"whole structure of lay decision-making is pervasively subjected to neighborhood, municipal, and
state-wide plebiscites." Id. at 115. Conflicts of interest are a major problem in bureaucratic
populism, as they interfere with the ability to trust government actors, but strong limits on
conflicts of interest may interfere with the way local governments create responsiveness through
their encouragement of broad participation. With respect to smaller cities, I think this an
extremely powerful argument. Its logic does not extend in an uncomplicated fashion to
megacities like Chicago, however. The prudential concerns Hills identifies about federal
prosecution of local officials only apply if there are relevant differences in the way residents of
big cities approach their local government than the federal government. It is an open questionone that bears future study-whether "participatory populism" describes big city politics. That
said, there is no reason to believe that federal prosecution provides much of a check on
institutionalized local corruption in places like Chicago. At best, it would be like a game of
whack-a-mole played at an extremely fast speed. No prosecutor has a fast-enough hammer to hit
all local corrupt actors.
62. Last one, guaranteed. ANNIE HALL, supra note 6.
63. Schleicher, The City, supra note 19, at 42-48.
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candidates on the ballot.M This would leverage what people know
about high profile figures, like Mayor Daley, into a quasi-party
democracy at the local level. Or states could use election law to create
real local party democracy. States could repeal laws that guaranteed
ballot placement in local elections to parties that did well in
gubernatorial elections, and could pass laws that in a number of ways
reduce the penalties for switching parties between elections (e.g., same
day registration). 65 This would make it more likely that the national
party that is the minority at the local level could rebrand itself for local
elections. More radically, states and cities could permit fusion at the
local level only, or even bar parties registered at the state-wide level
from ballot access in local elections.
There are many ways one can think of achieving the goal of
increasing competition at the local level. I am not sure I have all or the
best of them. But I do think that the best way to fight the problem of
urban political corruption is with more rather than less politics.

64.

Chris Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Making Democracy Work in San Francisco, S.F.

CHRON., Feb. 28, 2010, at E4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/
02/27/IN931C4HQ4.DTL.
65.

Schleicher, City Council Elections, supra note 38, at 468-73.

